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The year 2018 marked the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the
American Convention on Human Rights.1 On July 16 of that year, United
Nations Secretary-General António Guterres arrived at the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica, to kick off a week of
celebratory symposiums, panels, and lectures.2 Amid protests just outside the
Court on the human rights violations in Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega,
which the UN had just condemned,3 international jurists, human rights
scholars, and dignitaries convened to hear Secretary-General Guterres and
Costa Rican President Carlos Alvarado Quesada give welcoming keynote
addresses and congratulate the Court on its 40th birthday.4
1

I/A Court H.R., Comunicado: Más de 1500 personas asisten a la semana de eventos en
conmemoración del 40 Aniversario de la creación de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos (July 23, 2018), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/comunicados/cp_31_18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CWZ3-VDVE].
2
Author witnessed events firsthand; see also Nicaragua, Costa Rica… Las noticias del
lunes, UN NEWS (July 16, 2018), https://news.un.org/es/story/2018/07/1437932
[https://perma.cc/JK4E-NL2A].
3
Guterres y Alvarado hablan sobre democracia y condenan la violencia en Nicaragua,
AGENCIA EFE (July 17, 2018), https://www.efe.com/efe/america/portada/guterres-yalvarado-hablan-sobre-democracia-condenan-la-violencia-en-nicaragua/200000643693252 [https://perma.cc/G3Q3-G6TS].
4
I/A Court H.R., supra note 1; Alvarado y Guterres celebrarán el 40 aniversario de
creación de la CorteIDH, AGENCIA EFE (July 10, 2018), https://www.efe.com/efe/
america/portada/alvarado-y-guterres-celebraran-el-40-aniversario-de-creacion-lacorteidh/20000064-3677881 [https://perma.cc/9HJG-JKAN].
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One of the world’s three regional human rights tribunals, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (“Inter-American Court”)5 is part of a
broader regional system conceived within the ambit of the Organization of
American States (OAS) during the 1948 genesis of the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration”).6 The American
Declaration and the American Convention on Human Rights (“American
Convention,” “ACHR”), together with the OAS Charter, may be said to
comprise an “Inter-American Bill of Human Rights.” As the principal human
rights treaty of the OAS, the American Convention lists the positive rights of
individuals and guidelines for interpreting those rights, supplies instructions
for adopting the treaty, and provides for an Inter-American Court and an
Inter-American

Commission

of

Human

Rights

(“Inter-American

7

Commission,” “Commission”). To access the Inter-American Court, an
5

The Inter-American Court, located in San José, Costa Rica, is an autonomous institution
with the mission of applying and interpreting the American Convention. It is comprised of
seven judges, elected by the Member States of the OAS. INTER-AM CT. H.R., ABC OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2018: WHAT, HOW, WHEN, WHERE AND
WHY OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 2-3 (2019) [“ABC of the Inter-American Court”], available at http://www.
corteidh.or.cr/sitios/libros/todos/docs/ABCCorteIDH_2019_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4UW-H72H]. It has the following three primary functions: contentious,
in which it may determine whether a state has violated any of the rights enshrined in the
Convention; advisory, in which it may respond to consultations or make interpretations
requested by OAS Member States or organs of the OAS itself; and cautionary, in which it
may prescribe provisional means in cases of “extrema gravedad y urgencia, y cuando se
haga necesario evitar daños irreparables a las personas” (“extreme gravity and urgency,
and whenever necessary to avoid irreparable harm to individuals”). Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,”
arts. 63, 64, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 [hereinafter American
Convention].
6
See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, Bogotá, Colombia, May 2, 1948 [hereinafter American Declaration].
7
See American Convention, passim. The Inter-American Commission is a principal
organ of the OAS, with the primary objective of promoting the observance and defense of
human rights, and decides cases of complaints submitted by Member States, individuals,
and NGOs, and serves as a consultative organ of the OAS to this end. It is composed of
seven commissioners, and is headquartered in Washington, D.C., USA. I/A Court H.R.,
ABC of the Inter-American Court 5 (2018), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
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OAS Member State must ratify the ACHR and take the additional step of
declaring that it recognizes the contentious competence8 of the Court as
binding ipso facto.9 At present, 23 States have signed and ratified the
Convention10 and, of those, 20 have recognized the jurisdiction of the
Court.11
As an OAS Member State, the United States is subject to the jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Commission.12 Because the US was part of the Ninth
International Conference of American States, which adopted the American
Declaration, but has not ratified or acceded to the ACHR, the Commission
applies the principles of the American Declaration in deciding cases with
regard to the US.13 Indeed, the Commission has scrutinized the US with
respect to its practices in such areas as the death penalty, immigration, racial
justice, and conditions at the Guatánamo Bay Detention Center.14 However,
the US has rarely implemented the decisions of the Commission, considering
them to be mere recommendations or suggestions.15 In the same way, despite
holdings that contemplate the American Declaration as a source of legal
obligations,16 the US considers the American Declaration to be a non-binding
sitios/libros/todos/docs/ABCCorteIDH.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF5X-TEFT]; see IACHR,
What is the IACHR?, OAS, http://www.oas. org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp, [https://
perma.cc/Y8PZ-HF24] (last visited Aug. 8, 2018).
8
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
9
American Convention, art. 62(1).
10
ABC of the Inter-American Court, supra note 7, at 3.
11
Id. at 6.
12
The US was part of the Ninth American International Conference, which approved the
adoption of the American Declaration in 1948 in Bogotá, Colombia. See American
Declaration.
13
Thomas Antkowiak, The Americas, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 425, 428
(Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, & Sandesh Sivakumarian eds., 3rd ed. 2018).
14
Michael Camilleri & Danielle Edmonds, Working Paper, An Institution Worth
Defending: The Inter-American Human Rights System in the Trump Era 2 (THE
DIALOGUE, Working Paper, 2017) [hereinafter An Institution Worth Defending], available
at
http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/IACHR-Working-Paper_
Download-Resolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7WH-7EQY].
15
Id.
16
Antkowiak, supra note 13, at 426.
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instrument “‘that does not itself create legal rights or impose legal obligations
on signatury [sic] states’ and that . . . does not constitute a source of
affirmative obligations such as the exercise of due diligence.”17 In contrast to
the American Convention, which is undoubtedly a binding treaty, the US
refers to the Declaration as “una noble enunciación de las aspiraciones de
los Estados Americanos en cuanto a los derechos humanos” 18 (“a noble
statement of the aspirations of the American States in regard to human
rights”)—and that’s all.19 Despite this friction, the US has historically been a
vocal supporter of the Commission; indeed, it was instrumental during the
Commission’s early years and, from the beginning, the US has been a major
donor to both the Commission and the OAS.20
The United States signed the American Convention in 1977 but has neither
ratified it nor accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court.21 Ratification is the next step in implementing the treaty’s provisions
in the US, and thus in increasing human rights protection in the country and
17

IACHR, Considerations Related to the Universal Ratification of the American
Convention and other Inter-American Human Rights Treaties 30, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.152
Doc. 21 (2014) (quoting INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON
IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS, ¶ 24,
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 78/10 2010)).
18
Interpretación de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre en
el marco del artículo 64 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Advisory
Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 12. (July 14, 1989).
19
The US has historically recognized the significance of the Declaration, stating in
proceedings before the Commission that it “accepts and promotes the importance of the
American Declaration. It is a solemn moral and political statement … against which each
member state’s respect for human rights is to be evaluated and monitored, including the
policies and practices of the US,” but it does not consider it to be a binding treaty. William
Andrews v. United States, Case 11.139, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 57/96,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 60 (1997).
20
Camilleri & Edmonds, supra note 14, at 2. However, the amounts of financial support
over the years have been minor, for example, less than US $6 million in 2016. Id.
21
Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos Suscrita en la Conferencia
Especializada Interamericana Sobre Derechos Humanos (B-32) [American Convention on
Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-32)], OAS, https://
www.oas.org/dil/esp/tratados_B-32_Convencion_Americana_sobre_Derechos_
Humanos_firmas.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/TD3Q-5DNA].
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the region. By investigating the principal legal and political barriers to US
ratification of the ACHR and analyzing potential impacts of ratification on
the US legal system, this article recommends that the United States Congress
ratify the American Convention on Human Rights with no reservations. 22
Specifically, the first part of the article discusses the United States’
continuing concerns over state sovereignty; reservations, understandings, and
declarations in the legacy of the Bricker Amendment and the doctrine of nonself-execution; preservation of the federalist balance of powers; and the
apparent incompatibilities between the American Convention and existing
US law. The second section suggests strategic legal and political reasons for
US ratification of the Convention given the present political climate. Finally,
the third portion briefly assesses the potential domestic legal repercussions
of avoiding the attachment of any reservations, and suggests options moving
forward in advocating for US ratification.

I.
UNITED STATES CONCERNS: SOVEREIGNTY, RUDS,
FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERACTION OF THE ACHR WITH US LAW
A.

State Sovereignty and US Exceptionalism vs. Conventionality Control
As perhaps the dominant international relations fear of the United States

since the 1950s, the concern over ceding state sovereignty to a “world
government”23 has been repeatedly cited directly and indirectly in arguments
by the US against ratifying numerous international human rights
instruments.24 An isolationist mentality developed during the Cold War that
was based in a realpolitik concern that the US, and many other states, should
22

It should be noted that the recommendation is not necessarily to also accept the Court’s
contentious jurisdiction, which is a distinct legal question with potential ramifications that
exceeds the scope of this article.
23
Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties
in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 309,
324-325 (1988) [hereinafter The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment].
24
See, e.g., Joseph Diab, United States Ratification of the American Convention on
Human Rights, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 323 (1992).
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focus on protecting their material and political resources and, in the specific
case of the US, do what was necessary to reinforce its status as a main world
power.25 In the human rights context, this mentality has manifested as an
extreme reluctance to sign or ratify international human rights treaties.
Esteemed human rights scholar Louis Henkin notes in this regard that
the resistance is deeper. There is resistance to imposing national
standards on matters that have long been deemed “local”; even
more, there is resistance to accepting international standards and
scrutiny on matters that have been ours to decide. A deep
isolationism continues to motivate many Americans, even some
who are eager to judge others and to intercede on behalf of human
rights in other countries. Human rights in the United States, they
believe, are alive and well. We have nothing to learn, and do not
need scrutiny from others, surely not from the many countries where
human rights fare so badly.26
As suggested by Professor Henkin, for many, this Hobbesian, political realist
attitude of conservatism also went hand-in-hand with a “city on a hill”flavored “US exceptionalism.”27 As a cultural and political ideology, US
exceptionalism involves the self-congratulatory presumption that both the
25

See, e.g., Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi, U.S. Exceptionalism and the Strengthening
Process of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 20 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19 (2003). For
example, the phenomenon of political realism has been evidenced in the context of the
universal human rights system, in which the US and many other Western countries were
generally receptive to civil and political rights, reflected more in the constitutions and laws
of the US and Europe, while rejecting economic, social, and cultural rights as on a lesser
level than civil and political rights and the domain of communist states; ratification of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights was thus in some
contexts seen to be a display of support for socialism. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN
R. RATNER, & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 382-391 (4th ed., 2015).
26
Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 422-23 (1979).
27
See Rivera Juaristi, supra note 25; see Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of
International Human Rights: A Source of Social Justice in the U.S., 3 N.Y. CITY L. REV.
59, 63 (1998) (“[W]e must confront the myth that the U.S. Constitution is the best in the
world. Domestically, the myth obscures the fact that the Constitution was drawn to protect
the interests of white, male, propertied men and that the legitimation of slavery was at its
heart and remains today its unredressed legacy.”).
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values and the political and legal systems—and therefore the human rights
framework—of the US are unique and worthy of global admiration.28 In the
present context, it manifests, as Professor Henkin implies, in the belief that
the US need not ratify international human rights treaties because it already
has a strong legal system and internal mechanisms to protect human rights. 29
For its part, the US Congress has flipflopped over the years in its support of
the Inter-American system; the latest round of ebbs and flows in support
involved Republican Senators’ opposition to funding the Inter-American
Commission in early 2019.30
Unsurprisingly, the phenomenon of US exceptionalism has opened the
United States to global criticism. The practice has invited other states to
condemn and challenge the US for not fully implementing the principles of
mutuality and reciprocity, and, by extension, to criticize the OAS for
allowing this to happen.31 For instance, former Bolivian President Evo
Morales and former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez were vocal critics
during their respective presidencies of what they saw as a hypocritical “U.S.
empire,” and Chávez justified Venezuela’s infamous denouncement of the
American Convention in 2012 in part on the reasoning that Venezuela need

28

Stephen M. Walt, The Myth of American Exceptionalism, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 11,
2011),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism/
[https://perma.cc/LVD2-QY3Y].
29
Henkin, supra note 26, at 422-23.
30
In December 2018, nine Republican Senators sent a letter to the US State Department
demanding that it cut funding to the Inter-American system based on the latter’s support
for the legalization of abortion; in February 2019, two Senators and two Congressmen, all
Democrats, as well as five former US members of and nominees to the IACHR, sent two
respective letters in response, recognizing the great human rights impacts of the
Commission in the region and urging the Secretary of State to instead bolster funding. See
Former U.S. IACHR Members and Nominees Urge State Department Not to Withdraw
Funding, GLOBAL AMERICANS (Feb. 19, 2019), https://theglobalamericans.org/2020/02/
former-u-s-iachr-members-and-nominees-urge-state-department-funding/
[https://perma.cc/U22P-HD6D]; see Press Release, U.S. H.R. Comm. on Foreign Aff.,
Democratic Leaders to Pompeo: Continue Funding the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Feb. 26, 2019) (on file with author).
31
Rivera Juaristi, supra note 25, at 19-20.
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not continue to bind itself to a treaty to which other OAS Member States are
not bound.32
Moreover, former US Ambassador to the UN Charles Yost stated in 1979,
during the Senate hearings on ratification of the ACHR and other human
rights treaties, that the United States’ failure in the past to ratify such accords
had been politically embarrassing:
Our refusal to join in the international implementation of the
principles we so loudly and frequently proclaim cannot help but give
the impression that we do not practice what we preach, that we have
something to hide, that we are afraid to allow outsiders even to
inquire whether we practice racial discrimination or violate other
basic human rights. Yet we constantly take it upon ourselves to
denounce the Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam, Argentina, Chile, and
many other states for violating these rights. We are in most instances
quite right to do so, but we seriously undermine our own case when
we resist joining in the international endeavor to enforce these
rights, which we ourselves had so much to do with launching. 33
While discussing possible cessions of state sovereignty is already
controversial, this conversation may be furthered strained by what some may
see as the potential for increased state responsibilities, upon ratification of
the ACHR, under the modern doctrine of “conventionality control.” This
doctrine, originated by the Inter-American Court,34 recognizes that domestic
officers and authorities must respect both the rule of law in their unique
domestic legal system(s) and the international treaties that have been ratified
by the state in question, and thus seek to harmonize these competing

32

Id.
International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the S. Comm. On Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong. 4 (1979) (statement of Charles Yost, Former U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations).
34
See Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶¶ 123-25 (Sep. 26, 2006).
33
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priorities.35 In doing so, domestic judiciaries “at all levels, must exercise ex
officio a form of ‘conventionality control’ between domestic legal provisions
and [an international treaty, in this case the American Convention], obviously
within the framework of their respective competences and the corresponding
procedural regulations.”36 Critically, the Inter-American Court has held that
domestic judiciaries “must take into account not only the treaty itself, but also
the interpretation thereof by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate
interpreter of the American Convention.”37 This would include the Court’s
corpus juris (or “block of conventionality”), i.e., case law and advisory
opinions concerning the ACHR, its protocols, and other international human
rights treaties created within the OAS.38
Further, in a conventionality-control analysis in cases where the state’s
judicial bodies may have violated the state’s international obligations, the
Inter-American Court may be able to engage in a type of review of “the
respective domestic procedures to establish their compatibility with the
American Convention.”39 However, the Court has clarified that this would
not bestow absolute jurisdiction upon the Court to review domestic decisions
ad infinitum, as such a practice would clearly upset the scope of its
international jurisdiction; the Inter-American Court is not a tribunal of fourth
35

Cabrera García & Montiel Flores v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 225 (Nov. 26,
2010).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Conventionality Control The New Doctrine of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 93, 97 (2015) [hereinafter
Conventionality Control]; Cabrera García & Montiel Flores v. Mex., Concurring Opinion
of Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 26 (Nov. 26,
2010) [hereinafter Concurring Opinion of Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor].
39
Concurring Opinion of Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor, supra note 38, ¶ 5 (quoting Gomes
Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguala”) v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 200, ¶ 44 (July 6, 2009).
The Inter-American Court does this via the following loosely formed test: “analyz[ing]
[the actions of national judges] in light of domestic laws and always having regard to the
American Convention…” Id., ¶ 8.
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instance or last resort.40 Rather, the doctrine of conventionality control is
tempered by the ever-present requirements of subsidiarity and exhaustion of
domestic remedies under Article 46 of the ACHR. 41 In this way and under
these constraints, the “convention” that is being “controlled” refers to the
practice whereby domestic courts must consider the requirements of
international treaties to which the state is party, and the Inter-American Court
similarly must take into account domestic norms and legislation.42
In the present context of US ratification of the American Convention, this
doctrine may manifest as an additional requirement in the ensuing
interpretation, post-ratification, of the treaty by US courts. That is, the US
would arguably be required to not only limit its interpretation of the
Convention to the text of the treaty itself, but also to consider and perhaps
even permit itself to be bound by the interpretations made by the InterAmerican Court. On the one hand, such a form of deference may further
dissuade an already-concerned US, clinging to sovereignty, from ratifying
the ACHR or other such human rights treaties.
On the other hand, for a number of reasons, the domestic implications of
the doctrine as it would be applied in the US might not be as worrying. First,
application of the doctrine may in the immediate future be moot, faced with
the more preliminary question of US ratification of the ACHR. While the
Inter-American Court in Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico 43 did
not specify whether the doctrine would apply to states that have ratified the
ACHR but have not accepted the contentious competence of the Court, i.e.,
the situation this article advocates, it is perhaps unlikely that it would, as it is
inherently a tool of the Inter-American Court. Indeed, as a procedural matter,
the only way for the Court to assess conventionality control seems to be in

40

Id., ¶ 9.
Id.
42
See id. at para. 7.
43
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 225 (Nov. 26, 2010).
41
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the context of a contentious case.44 As of 2016, the Court had referenced the
doctrine in relation to judgments involving 14 different states, all of which
had accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction.45
But questions of mootness aside, the doctrine may still not result in many
domestic changes within the US. For example, the “type” of conventionality
control, or manner in which it is carried out, is left to individual states. 46 In a
nod to state sovereignty, this implies that the state in question will be able to
implement the doctrine to the extent feasible within its existing laws and
practices. Further, US courts are already familiar with the concept of
applying treaty law, as the US Constitution provides that the supreme law of
the land includes international treaties,47 and the ACHR would hardly be the
first for US courts.
Rather, the doctrine could manifest certain positive effects in the domestic
legal system of the US, leaving much of the current system intact. In
effectuating the doctrine, the Inter-American Court plays an erudite and
even-handed role in balancing the ius constitutionale commune, or
constitutionalism of the region, with the primacy of human rights and related
values.48 There is thus the potential for institutional dialogue to develop
between US courts and the Inter-American Court, to the benefit of both,
leading to increased confidence, and perhaps increasing deference over time,
on the part of the Inter-American Court concerning the decisions of US
courts. Indeed, as a key concept of the subsidiarity principle inherent to the
44

See Ferrer Mac-Gregor, supra note 38, at 95.
Id.; see ABC of the Inter-American Court, supra note 7, at 6.
46
Ferrer Mac-Gregor, supra note 38, at 97; Sergio García Ramírez, The Relationship
Between Inter-American Jurisprudence and States (National Systems): Some Pertinent
Questions, 5 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 145 (2015) (“The Inter-American
Court did not order States to establish regimes of diffuse control, although the Court would
probably sympathize with such a regime. The Court left the final decision to States, so long
as their solution permits judicial control of conventionality…”).
47
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
48
See García Ramírez, supra note 46, at 126. For instance, some values may even mesh
as regards, e.g., the US Constitution’s emphasis on individual rights and the InterAmerican Court’s pro homine interpretation of the ACHR. Id. at 127–30.
45
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Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction, “domestic actors are better suited to
understand the most effective way to internalize human rights norms in their
local context.”49 In this regard, the Court’s confidence in US courts may even
be a subsidiary issue, due to the robust legal system of the United States.
Moreover, US courts could likewise draw on the interpretations of the InterAmerican Court, which is comprised of experts on the American Convention
and has a respectable body of jurisprudence and guiding materials, instead of
having to parse through the Convention’s many articles anew. Such an
institutional dialogue would be useful from a judicial-economy lens, and it in
turn would help to establish uniformity, and therefore predictability, in
interpreting the ACHR, thus helping to define and develop human rights in
the region more broadly.
Hence, while from the outset the doctrine of conventionality control might
be perceived as enflaming already acute qualms over sovereignty and an
entrenched sense of US exceptionalism, in practice it might not require
terribly intrusive modifications and could actually benefit US courts. In any
event, it should not impede the preliminary issue of ratification of the ACHR.
B.

Federalism and its Tireless Preservation
Hand-in-hand with the broader question of state sovereignty go US

concerns over maintaining the federal-state balance of powers. For much of
the 20th century through the present, the US has been a stalwart defender of
the idea that human rights are a domestic issue. 50 A concern since the 1950s
and ‘60s has been that international law and the obligatory commitments it
engenders would be used to diminish states’ rights and therefore undermine
the US system of government.51 It is against this backdrop that the United

49

Ariel Dulitzky, An Alternative Approach to the Conventionality Control Doctrine, 109
AJIL UNBOUND 100, 104 (2015).
50
Diab, supra note 24, at 335.
51
Id.
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States has sought to characterize the subject of human rights within the US
as beyond the competency of an international tribunal or organ. 52
A main fear among US states has thus been that ratification by the federal
government of not only the American Convention but also other international
treaties would legitimize federal interference in subjects that the states
understood as under their exclusive jurisdiction.53 Because one of the
distinguishing characteristics of the US system of government is the
demarcation of powers between the federal and state governments, one of the
distinguishing concerns from the perspective of the US and other federal
states54 is any threat to this system of federalism.
Accordingly, during the drafting of the American Convention the US
delegation proposed the incorporation of Article 28,55 known as the “Federal
Clause.”56 The Federal Clause would prevent the ACHR from obligating the
US Government to exercise jurisdiction over matters over which it might not
otherwise have authority, i.e., the subject matter left to the states under the

52

Id. at 328.
This fear may have been well-founded; indeed, certain provisions of the ACHR have
been argued to interfere with state legislation, particularly with regard to penal codes,
which tend to vary widely by state. Id. at 328-29. For an example of ongoing concerns
regarding the overextension of the federal government into the states’ sovereign capacity
to regulate themselves, see U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
54
Multiple other large states in the region, significantly including Brazil, Colombia, and
Mexico, are also federal states. Donald T. Fox, Convention on Human Rights and
Prospects for United States Ratification, 3 HUM. RTS. 243, 254 (1973).
55
Id., at 253.
56
American Convention, art. 28, which provides in part as follows:
1. Where a State Party is constituted as a federal state, the national government
of such State Party shall implement all the provisions of the Convention over
whose subject matter it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction.
2. With respect to the provisions over whose subject matter the constituent
units of the federal state have jurisdiction, the national government shall
immediately take suitable measures, in accordance with its constitution and its
laws, to the end that the competent authorities of the constituent units may adopt
appropriate provisions for the fulfillment of this Convention.
53
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10th Amendment to the US Constitution.57 The US wanted to ensure that any
federal state in the Americas, including itself, would not accept an
international obligation that may compel it to submit to jurisdictions other
than its federal government.58 In practice, the Federal Clause achieves the
following two principal things: 1) it tends to relieve federal governments of
the duty to prevent violations on the part of state governments, and therefore
potentially interfere in subjects of state jurisdiction,59 and 2) it allows federal
subdivisions—states, in the US—to retain their laws that are already in force
and adopt changes as they see fit.60
Thomas Buergenthal, former judge of the Inter-American Court and
renowned human rights scholar, notes that a problematic situation might arise
in regards to Article 28 if a federal state were also to consider the Convention
to be a non-self-executing treaty, as does the US.61 In such a case, that state’s
domestic courts may never even get as far as interpreting Article 28, or
applying it in light of other provisions of the treaty, due to the fact that it
would not be part of the binding law in that country. This would effectively
render Article 28 useless.

57

Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights,
in ANUARIO JURÍDICO INTERAMERICANO 1, 85-87 (1981).
58
Id. at 86.
59
Diab, supra note 24, at 332. This may be somewhat of a false or constructive relaxation
of the federal government’s duty, however, as under the doctrine of state responsibility,
states are responsible for human rights violations of their constituent units. See Peter Spiro,
The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 567 (1997).
60
See Thomas Buergenthal, The Federal Clause of the American Convention, in
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS 49-51 (Thomas
Buergenthal et al. eds., 3d ed. 1990); see also Fox, supra note 54, at 253 (“[T]he federal
clause which the United States delegation succeeded in obtaining completely disarms any
attack which could be made against an international human rights treaty on grounds of
‘states rights.’”).
61
Buergenthal, supra note 57, at 87.
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C.

Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
In the US, the decision to ratify a treaty first rests with the President, as

treaty ratification is inherent to the foreign relations power of the executive
branch.62 The proposed treaty is then submitted to the Senate, where it must
be passed by a two-thirds supermajority vote.63 Implementation of treaty
obligations is then carried out by both federal and state governments. 64
As part of the treaty ratifying process in the United States, the President,
through the Departments of Justice, State, and others depending on the treaty,
often proposes a series of reservations, understandings, and declarations
(RUDs) that the Senate must decide whether to adopt when ratifying the
treaty.65 The general purpose of RUDs is to qualify and limit obligations that
the state in question might accept that could potentially conflict with
domestic law.66 With regard to the American Convention, as with treaties
generally, RUDs must be made at the time of ratification or deposit of the
instrument of ratification; otherwise, they have no legal effect. 67 Further,
each RUD must have a valid purpose and “maintain inalterable the nature of
the convention itself.”68 That is, states can make any reservation or
understanding in regard to the ACHR as long as it is not contrary to its object
and purpose;69 the ACHR poses no other restriction on the attachment of
62

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., STUDY ON TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 106-71 at
152 n.33 (Comm. Print 2001).
63
U.S. CONST.art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
64
Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Legal Adviser, to State and Local Human Rights
Commissions (May 3, 2010), available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/
222323.htm [https://perma.cc/MK9K-YW8R].
65
Eric Chung, The Judicial Enforceability and Legal Effects of Treaty Reservations,
Understandings, and Declarations, 126 YALE L.J. 170, 172-73, 215 (2016).
66
Id.
67
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 313
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); Andrés E. Montalvo, Reservations to the American Convention on
Human Rights: A New Approach, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 269, 278 (2001).
68
Montalvo, supra note 67, at 279.
69
Effect of Reservations on Entry into Force of American Convention on Human Rights
(Arts. 75 and 75 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82,
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RUDs other than that they comply with the provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 70
Under the Vienna Convention, “‘reservation’ means a unilateral statement,
however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude
or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State.”71 Although loosely defined, some scholars have
attempted to tie more concrete meaning to the terms “reservation,”
“understanding,” and “declaration,” respectively.72 For instance, one
attempted distinction between a reservation and a declaration is that the latter
is not intended to modify the legal effect of the treaty, while the former
clearly is.73 However, it has also been argued that how a statement is defined
is not as important as the nature of its effect.74 Understood this way, any type
of RUD that modifies the treaty, or purports to merely interpret it but
effectively modifies its domestic impact—in particular, reservations masked
as understandings and declarations—can functionally amount to a
reservation.75 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the

Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 2, ¶ 22 (Sept. 4, 1982). While there has been limited
guidance under international law on what constitutes the “object and purpose” of a treaty,
the International Court of Justice has considered such factors as, e.g., the purpose of the
treaty and intent of the drafters, the rate and extent of adoption, and the views of signatory
states. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 9–15 (May 28); see Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek,
The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L.
311 (1998).
70
American Convention, art. 75.
71
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
72
See, e.g., Jessica Tillson, Reservations and the Future of Inter-American Justice, 6 CHI.KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 82 (2006).
73
Id. at 93.
74
Chung, supra note 65, at 194.
75
Penny M. Venetis, Making Human Rights Treaty Law Actionable in the United States:
The Case for Universal Implementing Legislation, 63 ALA. L. REV. 97, 103 (2011).
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United States thus further defines “declarations and understandings” in the
following way:
When signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state may
make a unilateral declaration that does not purport to be a
reservation. Whatever it is called, it constitutes a reservation in fact
if it purports to exclude, limit, or modify that state’s legal obligation.
Sometimes, however, a declaration purports to be an
“understanding,” an interpretation of the agreement in a particular
respect. Such an interpretive declaration is not a reservation if it
reflects the accepted view of the agreement. But another contracting
party may challenge the expressed understanding, treating it as a
reservation which it is not prepared to accept.76
As often the ultimate arbiter, when assessing a reservation of a state party,
the Inter-American Court has frequently determined the reservation’s
meaning based on its plain text, even when a state argues for a different
understanding.77
The US prepared a number of reservations regarding the American
Convention when the Carter Administration in 1977 sent the treaty, along
with three other human rights treaties, to the Senate for ratification. 78 The
RUDs then proposed may be characterized as outdated and unnecessary in
today’s legal and political climates. For instance, the purported principles
behind the Carter Administration’s many recommended RUDs were “1) to
make sure that [treaty provisions] were consistent with our domestic law; 2)
to insure [sic] that the Federal-State relationship is preserved; 3) to insure

76

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 313
cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
77
Chung, supra note 65, at 202. See also Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Preliminary
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 81, ¶¶ 82, 88 (Sept. 1, 2001) (“Interpreting the
Convention in accordance with its object and purpose, the Court must act in a manner that
preserves the integrity of the mechanism provided for in Article 62(1) of the Convention.”).
78
See generally U.S. State Dept. Letter to President Carter, Dec. 17, 1977, in Message
from the President of the United States to the Senate on Four Treaties Pertaining to Human
Rights, S. Exec. Doc. No. 29-118 (1978) [hereinafter Letter to the President], available at
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/treaty_95-19_95-21.pdf.
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that the treaties would not, in effect, become part of our domestic law
directly.”79 While the first two stated justifications seem reasonable enough,
the third becomes deeply problematic for reasons discussed below. In
particular, as the often-criticized implication of RUDs, such language has
been used to strategically weaken the effect of the ACHR and human rights
treaties in general by effectively precluding domestic claims or recognition
of an individual’s treaty-based rights.80 Additionally, such RUDs would
effectively cut off US courts and the Inter-American Court from each other:
they would not permit the Inter-American Court to interpret and build upon
the decisions of US courts that would themselves have been able to interpret
the ACHR, or vice versa, in order to understand and apply the jurisprudence
of each of these courts. RUDs seeking to so isolate US domestic law from
regional human rights jurisprudence thus impede the potential for
institutional dialogue and jurisprudential development between the InterAmerican Court and US courts, to the detriment of human rights development
and protection in the region.81
While the ability to make reservations is an unquestioned power of the
state, the US is often criticized for the frequency with which it employs RUDs
in treaties spanning beyond the ACHR. Some critics, for instance, have
condemned this US practice as “specious, meretricious, [and] hypocritical,”82
decrying what they see as the US reaping the benefits of apparent treaty
ratification without incurring the accompanying binding obligations. 83
79

International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong. 35 (1979) (statement of Jack Goldklang, Att’y Advisor, O.L.C.).
80
See Diab, supra note 24, at 333.
81
Id. at 333-34.
82
Louis Henken, Editorial Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 341 (1995).
83
Id. at 344.
(By adhering to human rights conventions subject to these reservations, the United States,
it is charged, is pretending to assume international obligations but in fact is undertaking
nothing. It is seen as seeking the benefits of participation in the convention … without
assuming any obligations or burdens. The United States, it is said, seeks to sit in judgment
on others but will not submit its human rights behavior to international judgment. To many,
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Despite this, some academics have suggested that the United States’ use of
RUDs may actually signal a respect for the process of international treaties. 84
For example, it is argued that contrary to authoritarian regimes, which may
tend to sign human rights treaties without any reservation or declaration and
later violate them with impunity,85 the US and other liberal democracies are
serious in their application and respect for treaties, including their acceptance
of human rights obligations:
It is very easy to sign a human rights treaty without any reservations
or understandings. Many authoritarian regimes have done so. . . .
[O]ne can almost judge those nations that take human rights
obligations seriously by the manner in which they have approached
the problems of reservations or understandings . . . From the
government’s perspective, if the United States did not care about
complying with its treaty obligations, it could simply ratify human
rights treaties with no reservations, declare them to be non-selfexecuting, and then refuse to enact implementing legislation to
conform domestic law to the treaty requirements. The fact that the
United States has adopted various RUDs, according to the
government, demonstrates that the United States is serious about
complying with its treaty obligations.86
Given the real-world legal effects of RUDs on the treaty process and in the
context of human rights, however, such a characterization seems illusory,
especially when faced with the prospect that RUDs may prevent individuals
from obtaining relief for human rights abuses. Because of this, minimizing
the use of RUDs whenever possible, such as limiting the practice to a ratione

the attitude reflected in such reservations is offensive: the conventions are only for other
states, not for the United States.).
84
See, e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 Yale J. Int’l. L. 129 (1999).
85
Id. at 203.
86
Id. at 178 (quoting Arthur Rovine & Jack Goldklang, Defense of Declarations,
Reservations, and Understandings, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES, at 54).
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temporis understanding with regard to the ACHR as suggested herein, is an
important objective.
1.

The Continued Presence of the Bricker Amendment
The “Bricker Amendment” of the 1950s engendered many aspects of both

RUDs and the US exceptionalism ideology. The climate created by attempts
to cling to the ideals of state sovereignty and US superiority led, broadly
speaking, to a strong reticence on the part of the US to sign international
treaties or submit itself to an international order. A particularly strong
motivator in this regard was the fear that its citizens might find themselves
under the jurisdiction of some organ outside of the jurisdiction and control of
the US.87
The Bricker Amendment was comprised of a series of proposals of
constitutional amendments, many of which were sponsored by Senator John
Bricker between 1951 and 1957.88 In a display of a conservative and
profoundly isolationist perspective, founded in the belief that the subject of
human rights should belong to the individual sovereign states and not
international tribunals, each proposal attempted to limit the domestic effects
of treaties and other international agreements.89 In essence, the Bricker
Amendment had three general objectives: 1) establish all international
accords as non-self-executing and as requiring implementing legislation
(discussed below); 2) negate Missouri v. Holland,90 in which the Supreme
Court held that the 10th Amendment does not apply to legislation that
implements treaties because the power to make treaties rests with the federal

87

See Teresa Young Reeves, A Global Court? U.S. Objections to the International
Criminal Court and Obstacles to Ratification, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 15, 16 (2000); see also
Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 23, at 325-26.
88
See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS, Chapter 5(F): “Interpretation, Termination, and ‘Unsigning’ of
Treaties” (2017).
89
Id.
90
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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government;91 and 3) establish that treaties be subject to the same
constitutional limits that demarcate the power of the federal government. 92
However, there were inherent problems with Senator Bricker’s strategy.
First, human rights is not an inappropriate subject for treaties to apply
domestically: the US Constitution does not restrict the subject matter of
international agreements, but rather only requires the approval of the
Senate.93 The Supreme Court has, moreover, upheld treaties that impact
domestic subjects,94 as the American Convention would.
Second, the subject of human rights is not inappropriate under
international law either. For example, while the United Nations Charter may
limit the jurisdictional authority of the UN in domestic matters, 95 the subject
of human rights has always been an exception.96 Indeed, the idea of human
rights must necessarily transcend political borders: it is inherent in treaties
such as the American Convention that an international community is
necessary to protect and promote human rights, instead of leaving such
responsibilities to the whim of fallible state governments that may have
incomplete or inadequate internal mechanisms and norms to realize such
protection. An integral part of the framework of human rights protection

91

Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 23, at 314.
The difficulty, as Senator Bricker viewed it, was the subsequent decision of
the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland, which left ambiguous the meaning
of Article VI, paragraph 2. Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land
only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to
be so when made under the authority of the United States. It is open to question
whether the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts
prescribed to make the convention.
Id. at 433.
92
See id. at 313-15.
93
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
94
See Diab, supra note 24, at 333-36 (referencing, e.g., Holland, supra note 90 (regarding
protection of migratory waterfowl) and De Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890)
(regarding inheritance of land rights)).
95
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
96
See Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L. L. 866 (1990).
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consists of the capacity of a state to bring to light, or publicly denounce, other
states on the world stage for human rights violations.97 As such, even the
principle of domestic nonintervention does not result in states being immune
to international scrutiny or even intervention if they torture, assassinate,
arbitrarily detain, or commit other human rights abuses on their citizens. 98
While the Bricker Amendment was fortunately rejected by the Senate,
officials in the Eisenhower Administration, notably including Secretary of
State John Dulles, adopted the spirit of the Amendment as a policy in part to
ensure its defeat in the Congress, and declared that the State Department
would not seek ratification of any human rights treaties. 99 Despite policy
changes during the Kennedy and Nixon Administrations, this policy created
a legacy with wide-ranging political implications that survive today,100 and
almost certainly contribute to the current political climate of general
reluctance to sign and ratify international treaties.
2.

Non-Self-Executing Treaty Provisions
One of the proposals, and lingering policies, from the Bricker Amendment

era was to interpret all human rights treaties as non-self-executing.101 A nonself-executing treaty provision is one that will not automatically enter into

97

See Rivera Juaristi, supra note 25, at 21 (“Human rights are inherently of concern to the
international community.”).
98
Louis Henken, The Constitution, Treaties and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 1012, 1030 (1968) (“Today, human rights are of deep ‘international concern’ …
Human rights in other countries have become, ineluctably, this country’s business.”).
99
See Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights: A
Source of Social Justice in the U.S., 63 N.Y. CITY L. REV. (1998); see also Henkin, supra
note 98, passim.
100
See Fox, supra note 54, at 246-48; see also David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification
of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35, 38-39, n. 45 (1978).
101
Henkin, supra note 82, at 348 (In its principal version, the Bricker Amendment included
the following provision: “A treaty shall become effective in the United States only through
legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.” The clause would have rendered
all treaties non-self-executing. It would also have prevented congressional implementation
of a treaty by legislation that was not within congressional power apart from the treaty,
overruling Missouri v. Holland.).
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domestic force, but requires additional implementing legislation after
ratification.102 Interpretation of a treaty as non-self-executing is largely up to
the judiciary, which will look to the wording of the treaty in light of the
ascertained intent of the drafters.103 The US Supreme Court case of Foster &
Elam v. Neilson,104 in which the Court considered a claim to land possessed
by Spain and then France in the territory of the current state of Louisiana, is
a famous example of this doctrine of treaty interpretation. Although a treaty
under the US Constitution becomes the law of the land, akin to a legislative
act, the Supreme Court reasoned in Foster that when it behaves more like a
contract, i.e., one of the parties promises to perform an act, then the treaty
orients itself more toward the political realm and less toward the legal. 105 In
this way, the Court held that non-self-executing treaties require an
implementing legislative act or pronouncement following ratification before
they can be applied domestically in the US.106 This decision has since become
a powerful tool in today’s world: it is the position of the US government that
human rights treaties are not self-executing.107 That is, human rights treaties
do not automatically supersede or complement state or federal laws, or really
form part of US law at all, without such activating legislation enacted by
Congress.
Follow-up legislation after the ratification of a human rights treaty, then,
becomes vital. Yet it is precisely here that the US has garnered intense
criticism, as it does not consistently pass legislation to make human rights
treaties actionable or enforceable under domestic law. 108 That is, while
102

Id. at 346.
Diab, supra note 24, at 329-30.
104
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 7 L.Ed. 415 (1829), overruled on other grounds
by U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 8 L.Ed. 604 (1833).
105
Id. at 314-15.
106
Id.
107
Diab, supra note 24, at 330 (citing LOUIS HENKEN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 159-60 (1972)).
108
See Venetis, supra note 75, at 99, 104–110; see also Marie Wilken, U.S. Aversion to
International Human Rights Treaties, GLOBAL JUST. CTR. BLOG (June 22, 2017),
103
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interpreting treaties to be non-self-executing may on its face be a neutral
policy, the consistency with which the US attaches a RUD of non-selfexecution to a given human rights treaty and then fails to pass implementing
legislation is problematic; such an action might, in some cases, even be seen
as an excuse in order to prolong the assumption of human rights obligations
required by the treaty. Such a systematic approach by the US has led some
academics to criticize the practice by decrying understandings of non-selfexecution as “the most egregious type of RUD that renders human rights
treaties unenforceable.”109 In the human rights context, the pervasive use of
non-self-executing RUDs without subsequent implementation thus sends a
two-faced message that hearkens back to US exceptionalism and the priority
accorded to human rights on the national level.
With respect to the American Convention, it is yet an open question
whether the treaty even allows an interpretation that it is non-selfexecuting.110 Nevertheless, the US reads in an understanding of non-selfexecution to the ACHR as well. It interprets Article 2 as sufficiently flexible
to allow each country to implement the Convention consistently with its
domestic practices:
Some countries may choose to make the articles of the treaty directly
effective as domestic law and this article would permit them to do
so.[. . .] In the U.S. we would interpret this article as . . . permit[ting]
us to refer, where appropriate, to our Constitution, to our domestic
legislation already in existence, to our court decisions and to our
administrative practice as carrying out the obligations of the
Convention. [. . .] In other words, it is not the intention of the U.S.
http://globaljusticecenter.net/blog/773-u-s-aversion-to-international-human-rights-treaties
[https://perma.cc/3NPA-2DB9].
109
Venetis, supra note 75, at 98.
110
According to some experts, the plain language of the ACHR “strongly supports an
interpretation that it is self-executing.” Diab, supra note 24, at 330. For instance, Article 2
has been read to imply a simultaneous obligation on the part of states parties to take
implementing measures concurrently upon ratification, and thus the argument is that the
treaty carries a form of built-in self-execution which states agree to promptly undertake by
ratifying it. See id.
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to interpret the articles of the treaty in Part I as being selfexecuting.111
In spite of this, some academics urge that it was the intention of the treaty’s
drafters that states should not be able to simply decide, when it suits them, to
defer to their domestic legislation in determining which rights should be
incorporated into their domestic law.112 It is thus argued that provisions of
the ACHR were meant to become binding at the time a state becomes a party,
and the ratifying state should provide to its citizens, and all individuals within
its territory, the rights and liberties guaranteed by the treaty. 113 Such an
interpretation is logical, particularly given the spirit of the treaty. This debate
has not yet been resolved, and the understanding of human rights treaties as
non-self-executing continues as a frequent practice of a US Government that
remains concerned that its citizens do not find themselves in front of an
international organ it might not be able to influence.
D.

Incompatible Articles: US Law and the ACHR
There are additional specific concerns that the US has manifested in

relation to articles of the American Convention, explored in more depth in a
later section of this article.114 Briefly, these include Article 4 on the right to
life, Article 13 on the freedom of expression, and Article 24 on equality
before the law and nondiscrimination.
First, the US has specifically objected to obligations flowing from Article
4 of the ACHR, regarding potential implications around the legal status of
abortion and the death penalty. Regarding abortion, any impact of the
ACHR’s Article 4(1) on the legal status of abortion in the United States
would be negligible due to the addition of the phrase “in general,” which was
111

Conferencia Especializada Interamericana Sobre Derechos Humanos, San José, Costa
Rica, 7-22 de Noviembre 1969, Actas y Documentos, ii, 146-47, OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.2
(1973) (Declaración del Delegado de Estados Unidos) (emphasis added).
112
Diab, supra note 24, at 331.
113
Id.; American Convention, art. 1.
114
See infra Section III(A).
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added to the treaty provision so that it would not interfere with the legal status
of abortions in states parties. 115 As such, there is likely little risk to Roe v.
Wade on this front. Turning to the death penalty, while the American
Convention may require increased protections for those at risk of capital
punishment, the American Declaration already requires parallel changes that
the US, by virtue of being an OAS Member State, is subject to.116
As for other articles of the Convention, Article 13, on the freedom of
expression, originally permitted more restrictions on speech than are
permitted by US law. Restrictions were proposed in drafts of the Convention,
for example, on expressions that might result in incitement to
“discrimination, hostility or violence.”117 Considering this as too restrictive
with respect to the freedom of expression, and inconsistent with the First
Amendment to the US Constitution, which does not specify such
restrictions,118 the US delegation opposed such drafts of the ACHR. 119 Today,
the final version just limits speech as regards incitement to violence.120
In the ambit of equality before the law and nondiscrimination—both rights
enshrined in Article 24 of the ACHR—the US delegation had objected to a
draft provision that seemed to prohibit both public and private

115

Diab, supra note 24, at 338; see infra Section III(A)(1)(a). Such is the understanding of
other states in the region as well, such as Mexico, who declared that “‘in general’ used in
that paragraph does not constitute an obligation to adopt, or keep in force, legislation to
protect life ‘from the moment of conception,’ since this matter falls within the domain
reserved to the States.” Declarations/Reservations/Denunciations/Withdraws, AMERICAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS “PACT OF SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA,” Treaty References:
B-32, OAS, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_
on_Human_Rights_sign.htm [https://perma.cc/K2FH-JSKL] (accessed Nov. 24, 2018).
116
American Declaration, art. I; see Donald Fox, Current Development: Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Finds United States in Violation, 82 AM. J. INT’L. L. 601,
601-602 (1988).
117
THOMAS M. ANTKOWIAK & ALEJANDRA GONZA, THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS 234 (2017).
118
U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of
speech…”).
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ANTKOWIAK & GONZA, supra note 117, at 234–35.
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Id. at 235.
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discrimination.121 This was seen as contrary to the 14th Amendment to the
U.S.

Constitution,

which

does

not

explicitly

prohibit

private

discrimination.122 However, the US approved the final version of Article 24,
which it considered to be more limited and therefore more consistent with the
14th Amendment.123

II.

INTER-AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE AGE OF TRUMP
Over the past two decades, interactions between the US and the Inter-

American System have varied considerably.124 The Bush Administration
often expressed general support but no substantive promise, whereas under
President Obama, it seemed that the US might be on the path toward a better
relationship with at least the Inter-American Commission.125 During the
Obama Administration, a higher number of representatives, who were better
informed and could speak to the merits of the cases in question, attended
hearings of the Commission; the US State Department facilitated
investigatory missions at juvenile detention centers; and in 2015, the US itself
requested a hearing at the Inter-American Commission on the subjects of
criminal justice and race.126
Since the 2016 presidential election, however, the legacy of the moralistic,
overtly human rights-friendly Carter Administration127 has seemed little
more than a whisper. The administration of the self-proclaimed nationalist
Donald Trump128 seems to have catalyzed another change in relations
121

Id. at 36.
Id.
123
Id.
124
For a survey of political support for international human rights more generally under
US presidential administrations from Carter through Obama, see Luis da Vinha, Revisiting
the Carter Administration’s Human Rights Policy: Understanding Traditional Challenges
for Contemporary Foreign Policy, 7 REVISTA DE PAZ Y CONFLICTOS 99, 108-116 (2014).
125
Camilleri & Edmonds, supra note 14, at 2.
126
Id.
127
See da Vinha, supra note 124, at 103–108.
128
Felicia Sonmez, Trump: I’m a nationalist and I’m proud of it, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-im-a-nationalist-and-im-proud-of122
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between the US and the Inter-American System—this time for the worse.
Amidst a widely-reported culture of skepticism, isolationism, and
xenophobia, the foreign policy actions and agenda of the Trump
Administration have resulted in and may cause as of yet unknown
repercussions to US relations around the world—and the Inter-American
System has not gone untouched. In March 2017, for instance, representatives
of the US Government caused international outcry when they did not attend
a hearing of the Inter-American Commission on the Trump Administration’s
travel ban.129 This manifested as not only a missed opportunity to
demonstrate to the world the sincerity of the US in furthering human rights,
but also an international embarrassment, as the outcry was not helped by the
fact that the headquarters of the Commission are located in Washington, D.C.
The infamous travel ban itself—deemed by many a “Muslim ban”130—has
drawn widespread criticism and outraged condemnation as not only adverse
to the US Constitution and the values it embodies, but as a manifestation of
another failure: a deeper abrogation of human rights by the US.131 Human

it/2018/10/23/d9adaae6-d711-11e8-a10fb51546b10756_story.html?utm_term=.c52c37525385 [https://perma.cc/4JAW-3ZEF].
129
The official reason that was given was that the US could not attend the hearing while
litigation was ongoing on the same issues in US courts. This led to a condemnatory open
letter submitted by numerous human rights organizations to Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson, noting that the US has previously participated in hearings while litigation was
ongoing and such litigation should not impede the US from participating now or in the
future. Id. at 3. It is also worth mentioning that not attending a hearing does not prevent
the Commission from investigating the human rights practices in question; it only prevents
the US from being able to present its side. IACHR, supra note 17, at 14.
130
See Aaron Blake, Republicans insist this isn’t a ‘Muslim ban.’ Trump and Giuliani
aren’t helping their cause at all., WASH. POST: THE FIX, Jan. 30, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/30/republicans-insist-thisisnt-a-muslim-ban-trump-and-giuliani-arent-helping-them-make-thatcase/?utm_term=.1490c3c2c932 [https://perma.cc/ZD2C-CDG9].
131
See, e.g., Timeline of the Muslim Ban, ACLU OF WASH. (Nov. 25, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban [https://perma.cc/XA3B-484C]; see
also Charlotte Clymer, HRC Responds to SCOTUS Ruling on Muslim Ban, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN (June 26, 2018), https://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-responds-to-supreme-courtruling-on-muslim-ban [https://perma.cc/E7H8-9MBY].
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rights experts have even determined that the January 27, 2017 order breached
the US’s existing international human rights obligations of non-refoulement
and protection from discrimination based on race, nationality, or religion. 132
And the ban is not the end, nor the worst, of the administration’s immigration
policies: in the wake of Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s May 2018 “zerotolerance” policy of prosecuting each person caught crossing the border
illegally, thousands of families were forcibly separated, often with children
being detained in the US and their parents deported.133 Even after a
reunification order was issued by a District Court judge compelling the
government to reunite the impacted families, as of late summer 2018, almost
500 children remained in custody.134 Having drawn international
condemnation, this practice led to the Inter-American Commission issuing
multiple precautionary measures in August 2018, in which it directed the US
to reunite certain families and generally protect the rights of separated
immigrant families.135 Circumstances such as this are a powerful reminder of
states’ propensity to act in reprehensible manners, and thus of the necessity

132

US travel ban: “New policy breaches Washington’s human rights obligations” – UN
experts, UN experts, UN Off. High Commissioner on Hum. Rts. (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21136&LangID=E
[https://perma.cc/39K4-A5YA].
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Dara Lind, The Trump administration’s separation of families at the border, explained,
VOX (June 15, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/11/17443198/children-immigrantfamilies-separated-parents [https://perma.cc/K69T-BQXM] (“family separation is an
unpardonable atrocity”).
134
Maria Sacchetti, Still separated: Nearly 500 migrant children taken from their parents
remain in U.S. custody, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/immigration/still-separated-nearly-500-separated-migrant-children-remain-in-uscustody/2018/08/30/6dbd8278-aa09-11e8-8a0c-70b618c98d3c_story.html?utm_term=
.cc59bb26339a [https://perma.cc/4K22-AT6B].
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Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.[IACHR], Vilma Aracely López Juc de Coc and others
regarding the United States of America, Precautionary Measure No. 505-18, Resolution of
Aug. 16, 2018, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/2018/63-18MC505-18-USen.pdf; Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. [IACHR] Migrant Children affected by the “Zero
Tolerance” Policy regarding the United States of America, Precautionary Measure No.
731-18, Resolution of Aug. 16, 2018, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/2018/6418MC731-18-US-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKN6-ES9J].
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of survivors’ access to justice—here, significantly, including the InterAmerican System and the many remedies it can provide.136
Moreover, the Trump Administration’s response to the large “caravan” of
individuals who have traveled from Honduras to Mexico has been
alarming.137 The New York Times has characterized the rhetoric coming from
the White House as baseless and laden with conspiracy theories, particularly
in terms of unfounded allegations about the caravan’s origin, size,
constitution, and purpose.138 In November 2018, nearly 5,000 individuals
arrived at Tijuana, Mexico, many of whom fled “poverty, corruption, and
violence in their home countries.”139 US authorities at one point fired tear gas
at the migrants in response to the migrants’ throwing rocks at them, and the
Trump Administration announced the asylum process would not be easily
achieved.140 As part of these events, journalists and lawyers were
interrogated, detained, or blocked at the US-Mexico border by the US
136

For an insightful commentary on the scope and creativity of remedies the InterAmerican System has historically provided, see Thomas Antkowiak, An Emerging
Mandate for International Courts: Victim-Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice, 47
STAN. J. INT’L L. 279 (2011).
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Mexico’ deal on migrants, USA Today (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/world/2018/11/25/migrant-asylum-seekers-deal/2107726002/
[https://perma.cc/4CWE-ZV23]. As of February 2019, most migrants have left Tijuana,
around 3,000 having chosen to wait in line for the slow processing of US asylum petitions,
and others choosing to stay in Mexico, return home, or travel to other sections of the border
to attempt an illegal crossing or new asylum petition at another port of entry. Daniel
González & Rafael Carranza, What Happened to the migrant caravan that arrived in
Tijuana?, Arizona Republic (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/
politics/immigration/2019/02/09/immigration-migrant-caravan-tijuana-mexico-usborder-central-america/2747809002/ [https://perma.cc/Q9B5-LRXY].
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Brendan O’Brien, U.S. officials track migrant caravan activists, journalists: NBC,
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Department of Homeland Security, which human rights NGOs have called
on Congress to investigate.141 In addition, in the related refugee context,
fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020 saw progressively the lowest refugee
admission caps to date—from 45,000 to 30,000 to 18,000, respectively.142
While the President has discretion in setting these admissions limits, the
respective announcements have been strongly condemned by human rights
organizations143 and have served as yet another distress signal to human
rights watchdogs.
Thus, there is need for a political agenda that once again prioritizes human
rights, and another treaty-based manner by which to hold the US accountable
to honoring such an agenda. Despite the US-Inter-American relationship’s
apparent state of constant flux, there remain concrete and strategic policy
reasons that the US should ratify the American Convention. First, the
preceding discussion and current politics notwithstanding, the US has
continually held itself out as a global watchdog for human rights, in the sense
that the US frequently does not lose any time in criticizing other countries
when a human rights violation occurs within their borders. 144 It is possible
141

HUM. RTS. WATCH, US Harassing Journalists, Lawyers, Activists at Border:
Congressional Investigation Needed, (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/
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7, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/key-facts-about-refugees-tothe-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/C8BJ-M3J4].
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See generally Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty:
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U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports on Human
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that the appearance of hypocrisy in this respect will diminish US influence,
authority, legitimacy, and prestige in the region. Specifically, the failure of
the US to ratify the ACHR while challenging other countries could both be
costly in terms of diplomacy and “soft power”145 and limit the efficacy of
human rights dialogue in states that have not ratified the Convention or
demonstrated leadership in such issues. 146 Ratification would send a public
message of the high priority the US assigns to human rights protection, and
would also be an indication of hemispheric integration in furtherance of the
spirit of the OAS Charter.147 Regarding the latter in particular, the United
States’ limited participation has so far curbed opportunities for a global
North-South exchange in reference to distinct experiences in the Americas in
terms of progress, challenges, and best practices in the protection of human
rights.148 Ratification would allow the US to come to the table, as it were, and
become more honestly involved in such constructive dialogue.149
Indeed, simply put, “United States adherence [to the ACHR] is in the
national interest and in that of the world community.”150 Some scholars have
noted that it would also be smart economic policy for the US to involve itself
more in the region in this regard, in order to show an interest in the
development of smaller nations with which the US may have future trade
relations, and thus create a better climate for business and cultural and
political relations with nations that have ratified and adhere to the
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Convention.151 In this sense, ratification of the ACHR could contribute to
prosperity, stability, and even peace in the region.
Beyond the political realm, ratification would also bring certain legal
benefits to individuals within the US. For instance, it would advance the
development of human rights jurisprudence in US courts by allowing judges
to apply the provisions of the Convention directly, as discussed earlier. This
would progress and refine the concept of human rights in the US. Similarly,
it would open the door to institutional dialogue between the US courts and
Inter-American Court by allowing the two systems to share and more directly
build upon the jurisprudence of each other.152 Further, while ratification of
the ACHR could eventually pave the way to a human rights treaty-based right
of action in US courts and maybe even access to the Inter-American Court
and its remedial powers, it would at least help ensure higher human rights
standards and protections for US citizens. To be sure, as history shows, the
US is not above mass human rights violations. True protection of its citizens
and individuals within its borders thus depends on them having as much
access to justice as possible.

III.
DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF RATIFYING THE ACHR WITH NO
RESERVATIONS
In an era when the New York Times has determined that there has been an
“abdication on human rights,”153 the United States should not risk
diminishing or losing its diplomatic effectiveness concerning human rights

151

Richard N. Gardner, A Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A. J. 907, 908 (1967) (“Peace and
security, economic and social development and human rights are the three sides of the
triangle of world order.”); see also Donald Fraser, Freedom and Foreign Policy, 25
FOREIGN POL’Y 140 (1977).
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(Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981); see infra Section I(A).
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An Abdication on Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (March 27, 2017), https://www.
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[https://perma.cc/9XMT-H63S].
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in the region. Faced with a return to “hard power” policies, the promulgation
of “America first” realpolitik, and political realism over a more inclusive
liberalism, the United States should ratify the American Convention on
Human Rights with no reservations. Specifically, the US should 1) not
propose any reservations related to substantive rights, as doing so would be
redundant of US law; 2) not include an understanding of the treaty as nonself-executing as, particularly in the human rights context, such a RUD would
abrogate universal values and even thwart the object and purpose of the
treaty; and 3) not include any RUDs in reference to the federal-state balance,
though it could look to the states for early implementation of the treaty
provisions. By ratifying the Convention in this way, the US will take a needed
step toward expanding human rights protection and development at home and
abroad, lending legitimacy to the Inter-American Human Rights System,
increasing its own jurisprudence regarding human rights, and sending a
powerful signal that the US takes human rights seriously.
First, this proposal is informed by an overarching theme of avoiding usage
of RUDs whenever possible. It has been argued by many a scholar, politician,
and human rights expert that overusing RUDs could “risk compromising
broader treaty formulation and compliance among states.” 154 The use of
RUDs by the US has increased since 1960, and this growth continues
today.155 While the US is not alone in the practice of attaching RUDs to
treaties, with such increasing usage, more states may be prone to regard the
United States’ insistence on RUDs with skepticism and even mistrust.
Further, this could spark a backlash by treaty drafters, who may start to
include no-reservation provisions as boilerplate treaty language.156 As the
name implies, such provisions would proscribe the attachment of RUDs to a
given treaty; were a state to try to do so anyway, such an action would not
only be a blatant breach of the treaty but may also arguably even violate its
154
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object and purpose under the Vienna Conventions. Generally speaking, an
overreliance on the RUDs by the US, especially faced with the threat of noreservation treaty provisions, could have detrimental impacts on the corpus
of international treaty law and its evolution by effectively excluding the US
from multilateral treaty-making processes—or at least make its participation
much more stagnant and cumbersome.157
It is with this in mind that many human rights scholars have advocated for
the inclusion of only a few RUDs by the US in its ratification of treaties going
forward.158 Eric Chung, for instance, has suggested that RUD language go no
further than 1) a federalist reservation preserving the federal-state balance of
powers in the US; 2) an understanding that any treaty obligations will be
fulfilled in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws of the US; and
3) an understanding that to the extent multiple treaties contain similar or
overlapping subject matter, similar provisions will be subject to the same
RUDs.159 As will be explored more below, in the context of the American
Convention, Chung’s recommendations can be taken further. In sum, a
federal-state RUD is unnecessary by virtue of the ACHR’s Federal Clause,
the second suggested reservation is not needed as it is already impliedly
provided for by the US Constitution and domestic courts will always interpret
the Constitution as supreme, and the third is redundant if it mirrors the actual
practice of RUD attachment as understood by domestic courts.
A.

No Reservations on Substantive Rights
In the spirit of including as few RUDs as possible upon ratifying the

American Convention, the US should not attach any RUDs on particular
articles or substantive rights. Specifically, this amounts to avoiding the use
of reservations and understandings concerning Articles 3-26 of the

157
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Convention.160 During the Senate hearings on ratification of the ACHR in
1979, a legal adviser at the State Department, along with several other
officials, emphasized that “the substantive provisions of these four treaties
[including the ACHR] do not conflict in any way with basic U.S. law or
policy.”161
Yet, within the Carter Administration’s proposal of ratification of the
Convention, fifteen RUDs were suggested regarding particular substantive
rights.162 These can be broadly organized into the following three groupings:
RUDs that are redundant under the US Constitution and federal law, RUDs
that would be superfluous specifically in light of the Supremacy Clause, and
instances where the Convention provides greater protection than existing US
law.
1.
Redundancies under the Constitution and Laws of the United
States
First, the proposed reservations and understandings on Article 4, 163
paragraph (4) of Article 8,164 paragraphs (4) and (5) of Article 17,165 and
paragraph (8) of Article 22166 are arguably redundant under the Constitution
and present US law.
a)

Article 4: Right to life
The proposed reservation to Article 4, on the right to life, reads simply as

follows: “United States adherence to Article 4 is subject to the Constitution

160
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and other law of the United States.” 167 A brief explanatory note submitted
along with the recommended reservation implies that, with regard to the right
to life in particular, many provisions of the article may not be “in accord with
United States law or policy,” or implicate “unsettled” areas of the law, and
therefore such a broad reservation is necessary.168 While the ACHR provides
for some specific substantive limits to the death penalty not present in US
jurisprudence, it leaves intact the current status of abortion in the US;
however, this RUD may nevertheless be unnecessary in light of current US
law and legal trends.
Starting with the death penalty, as a threshold matter, any change that the
Convention may require of the thirty-one US states that still allow the death
penalty169 would parallel changes already required by the American
Declaration, an international instrument the US is already subject to. 170
Although the Declaration does not have the binding force of a treaty, the US
government is within its reach by virtue of being an OAS Member State.
Moreover, domestic attitudes regarding the death penalty have fluctuated
greatly over the past several decades.171 The absence of any reservation on
this provision may thus invite the continued development of the law and
167
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social values in this context, particularly as to the subject-matter
considerations of Article 4 on limitations of the death penalty to “the most
serious crimes”172 excluding political offenses and related common crimes.173
As regards the ratione personae considerations of Article 4, the US has
already undertaken to protect—i.e., prohibit capital punishment for—certain
of the populations mentioned in Article 4(5). As it stands, that provision
would prohibit application of the death penalty to minors under eighteen,
persons older than seventy, and pregnant women.174 Taking the last first, it is
currently illegal under US federal law to impose capital punishment on a
pregnant woman.175 Then, while there is no upper age limit on death-row
defendants in US states that allow capital punishment,176 the US Supreme
Court in 2005 struck down the death penalty as applied to persons who were
under age eighteen at the time of their crimes, as a violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.177 As such, aside from retaining the ability to apply
capital punishment to persons over seventy years old, the US has effectively
already abolished the death penalty for two out of the three populations
contemplated in Article 4(5), and so minimized the inconsistency between
US law and the ACHR in this respect.
With respect to abortion, the specific provision of “from the moment of
conception” in Article 4(1) of the ACHR spurs the concern that ratification
of the Convention could result in the prohibition of legal abortion in the
172

American Convention, art. 4(2). “Most serious crimes” are generally evaluated by level
of severity, i.e., crimes that affect the “most important individual and social rights,” and
have been interpreted to apply in “truly exceptional circumstances only.” IACHR, The
Death Penalty in the Inter-American Human Rights System: From Restrictions to
Abolition, OAS/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 68 (2011), pp. 55-60, available at https://www.oas.org/
en/iachr/docs/pdf/deathpenalty.pdf.
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Id. art. 4(4).
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American Convention, art. 4(5).
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18 U.S.C. § 3596b (1994).
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See, e.g., Amnesty International, The Death Penalty in 2017: Facts and Figures (Aug.
12, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/04/death-penaltyfacts-and-figures-2017/ (Aug. 12, 2018, 3:00 PM) [https://perma.cc/86NM-9RFS].
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Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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US.178 Indeed, Roe v. Wade,179 which famously decriminalized abortion in
1973, might be held to violate Article 4 and therefore result in an unfavorable
verdict by the Inter-American Court or Commission.180 At a time when Roe
seems especially fragile, this is worrisome. In the drafting negotiations, the
US, together with Brazil, determined that the subject of abortion should be
confined to national legislatures in lieu of being reckoned by the
Convention.181 Therefore, in a nod to states that have legalized abortion, the
ACHR currently attempts to compensate for this with the subordinate clause
of “in general” just before the clause recognizing life from the moment of
conception.182 That is, the final and present version of the article provides
that “[e]very person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall
be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”183
The Inter-American Court has, in its landmark decision Artavia Murillo et
al. v. Costa Rica, interpreted the clause “in general” to imply that the
protection of the right to life is not absolute but rather more nuanced in this
respect.184 In particular, reasoning that the embryo cannot be understood as a
person for purposes of Article 4, the Court held that the insertion of “in
general” means that exceptions exist to the general rule, and thus that legal
understandings of the right to life continue to be developed with the times.185
178

Diab, supra note 24, at 337.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
180
In fact, this has already happened with regard to the American Declaration, in the case
White v. U.S., Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (Mar. 6, 1981) (laws that permitted abortion were contested as a violation of
the Declaration’s Article 1 right to life).
181
ANTKOWIAK & GONZA, supra note 117, at 60.
182
American Convention, art. 4(1).
183
Id. (emphasis added).
184
Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 175-189, 204-221, 258 (Nov. 28,
2012).
185
Id. at ¶ 264 (“es posible concluir de las palabras ‘en general’ que la protección del
derecho a la vida con arreglo a dicha disposición [que ‘el embrión no puede ser entendido
como persona para efectos del artículo 4.1’] no es absoluta, sino es gradual e incremental
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In a more political nod, academics have similarly inferred that the intention
of the Convention’s drafters was to protect a right to life that does not
interfere with legal abortions in prospective states parties to the
Convention.186
b)

Article 8(4): Double jeopardy
The understanding applied to double jeopardy qualifications vis-à-vis

Article 8(4) is redundant due to the established nature of US law in this area.
Article 8(4) provides that “[a]n accused person acquitted by a nonappealable
judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the same cause.” 187 The
accompanying RUD is as follows:
The United States understands that the prohibition on double
jeopardy contained in paragraph (4) is applicable only when the
judgment of acquittal has been rendered by a court of the same
governmental unit, whether the Federal Government or a constituent
unit, which is seeking a new trial for the same cause.188
In the United States, the Supreme Court has recognized a “dualsovereignty” exception to double jeopardy. That is, the Court has held that
the federal government and state governments are independent sovereigns for
purposes of double jeopardy, and thus the same offense, if criminal under
both federal and state law, can give rise to dual prosecutions under these
different governmental units.189 The reasoning is that an “‘offence’ is defined
by a law, and each law is defined by a sovereign[;] … where there are two
sovereigns, there are two laws, and two ‘offences.’”190 Article 8’s prohibition
según su desarrollo, debido a que no constituye un deber absoluto e incondicional, sino
que implica entender la procedencia de excepciones a la regla general.”).
186
The legislative histories of both the ACHR and American Declaration imply that neither
was intended to require that Member States who had legalized abortion change their
domestic legislation. Diab, supra note 24, at 338.
187
American Convention, art. 8(4).
188
Letter to the President, supra note 78, at XIX.
189
See Gamble v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019).
190
Id. at 1965.
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of double jeopardy, under US law, would therefore be applicable only when
the acquittal has been given by a court of one governmental unit and that
same governmental unit seeks a new trial for the same cause, i.e., a state court
tries the same case on the same merits after a state-level acquittal, or the same
with federal courts.
The RUD becomes unnecessary, however, as it does not seem that Article
8(4), without more, would impact this Supreme Court precedent. Instead, the
Court and other judicial organs would likely draw upon Gamble and others
in the long line of “dual-sovereignty” doctrine jurisprudence to interpret this
provision as being read and applied with an understanding in line with the
above submission by the Carter Administration.
c)

Articles 17: Rights of the family
It is unnecessary to include RUD language that refers to an understanding

of provisions as goals to be achieved progressively rather than immediately,
as was the case with Article 17, on rights of the family.191 While Articles 1
and 2 require states parties to respect and protect by legislative measures the
rights contemplated by the Convention,192 there is no provision in the
Convention that requires states to adopt each article or rights protection
immediately. More immediate action may be implied by the contrast created
by Article 26’s “progressive” development of economic, social, and cultural
rights,193 but such a reading would surely be tempered by the procedural
considerations, and speed, of domestic legal change. Plus, if US law is

191

Here the following RUD was recommended: “The United States considers the
provisions of paragraphs (4) [on equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses] and (5)
[on equal rights of children born out of wedlock with those born in wedlock] of Article 17
as goals to be achieved progressively rather than through immediate implementation.” Id.
at XXI.
192
See American Convention, arts. 1 and 2.
193
American Convention, art. 26 (“The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, … with
a view to achieving progressively … the full realization of the rights implicit in the
economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of
the Organization of American States…”).
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moving, albeit gradually, toward the achievement of such a goal, a RUD to
this effect would one day be obsolete.
d)

Article 22: Freedom of movement
Finally, if the US is already bound by obligations under other treaties that

implicate a right under the ACHR, RUD language signaling that these other
treaty obligations constitute compliance is unnecessary. In the context of
Article 22 on freedom of movement and residence,194 for instance, the US
declaration considered that “US adherence to the Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees constitutes compliance with the obligation set forth in
paragraph (8) of Article 22.”195 The US, like most states, is under myriad
treaty commitments, and complies with these obligations in varying ways.
While perhaps a commentary on the necessity of a clause made redundant in
light of the Refugee Convention, the US reservation is nevertheless
unnecessary. It is a needless exercise to list all or any of the means of
compliance within a RUD, and RUD language to this effect would probably
not confine US obligations to just the Refugee Convention, if that was the
intended result, as parallel obligations would still arise under the American
Convention once ratified.
2.

Superfluity under the Supremacy Clause
Faced with a conflict between the Constitution and other legal provisions,

domestic courts in the United States will always interpret the former as
supreme over the latter due to the Supremacy Clause. 196 This is true even
though treaties, once ratified, become the law of the land.197 For example,
RUDs by the US to certain provisions of ACHR Article 13, on prior
censorship and war propaganda or “advocacy of national, racial, or religious
194

American Convention, art. 22.
Letter to the President, supra note 78, at XXI. The relevant provision of Article 22
engenders the non-refoulement obligation in refugee law. American Convention, art. 22(8).
196
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
197
Id.
195
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hatred” constituting incitement to violence or “other similar illegal action,”
read as follows: “The United States reserves the right to permit prior
restraints in strictly defined circumstances where the right to judicial review
is immediately available; the United States does not adhere to paragraph (5)
of Article 13.”198
While the State Department has thus interpreted part of Article 13 as
raising free-speech questions,199 under the Supremacy Clause any
inconsistency would likely be resolved in the US with deference to the First
Amendment. Furthermore, the US has a well-established legal framework
against abridging speech, qualified by the famous case of New York Times v.
Sullivan200 and similar jurisprudence,201 and such a level of entrenchment
only serves to further diminish the plausibility that a treaty provision like
Article 13 would change that. Moreover, on a procedural level, the
recommended reservation in regard to this provision—”[t]he United States
does not adhere to paragraph (5) of Article 13”202—may be fundamentally
improper, as it is antithetical to the idea of human rights that states should be
able to pick and choose which rights to protect, especially in the context of a
regional human rights treaty reaching more than 30 states. 203
3.

Heightened Protections under the ACHR
The protections afforded by such ACHR provisions as Articles 5, 9, and

14 go beyond the protections of existing US law. As this article advocates for
the increased development and utilization of human rights law, such
expansions are regarded as beneficial and such RUDs should be discouraged.
Indeed, political symbolism arguments aside, the essence of the argument for
ratification of the ACHR is to spur and inform the development of human
198

Letter to the President, supra note 78, at XX.
Id.
200
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
201
See Fox, supra note 54, at 267.
202
Letter to the President, supra note 78, at XX.
203
See, e.g., Diab, supra note 24, at 331.
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rights in the US and the region. Significantly, that includes increasing human
rights protections in the US.204 Unless the US is willing to hold itself to the
same, agreed-upon standards as the rest of the region, ratification of the
American Convention, and improving domestic and regional rights, is a
hollow act. Thus, reservations such as the following Carter-era proposals
should be avoided.
a)

Article 5: Right to humane treatment
With respect to Article 5, the following reservation was proposed:
The United States considers the provisions of paragraphs (4) and (6)
of Article 5 as goals to be achieved progressively rather than
through immediate implementation, and, with respect to paragraph
(5), reserves the right in appropriate cases to subject minors to
procedures and penalties applicable to adults.205

Paragraph (4) of Article 5 demands the segregation of accused from
convicted persons, save in exceptional circumstances,206 and paragraph (6)
contemplates the principle of rehabilitation as an essential aim of the
punishment of deprivation of liberty.207 The issues with a RUD concerning
progressive implementation are discussed above with respect to Article 17.208
As to the second part of the RUD, however, the text of Article 5, paragraph
(5) states that “[m]inors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be
204

See, e.g., Henkin, Rights: American and Human, supra note 26, at 423-24 (“The notion
that the United States would adhere to an international human rights agreement only
insofar as it would require no change in the way we do things seems—to put it mildly—
anomalous. One would have thought that the principal purpose of undertaking obligations
was to promise to do things one is not yet doing—in this instance, to improve our ways
where necessary to conform our behavior to common international standards.”); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“Laws are
a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. The
treaties of the United States to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law
of the land.”)
205
Letter to the President, supra note 78, at XVIII.
206
American Convention, art. 5(4).
207
Id. art. 5(6).
208
See infra Section III(A)(1)(c).
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separated from adults and brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as
possible, so that they may be treated in accordance with their status as
minors.”209 While US federal law might not yet meet the standard enshrined
in Article 5,210 strides are continually being made, at least in state courts, to
protect juveniles in the criminal context.211 For example, New York State in
2017 raised the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen years of age,
thereby intervening with sixteen- and seventeen-year-old individuals in
Youth Part or Family Court and housing such offenders in specialized
juvenile detention facilities.212 Provisions such as Article 5(5) may therefore
help more US states to recognize the rights of juveniles in this way.
b)

Article 9: Freedom from ex post facto laws
Next, the reservation on Article 9, which protects the freedom from ex post

facto laws, states that the “United States does not adhere to the third sentence
of Article 9,”213 which contemplates the principle of retroactive amelioration
discussed below. As a general matter, refusing adherence to certain rights
may be fundamentally improper, as it is antithetical that states should be able
to cherry-pick which rights to protect of a human rights treaty.214 Such a
practice further begs the question of how many enumerated rights can be
watered down or interpreted out of existence by RUDs before the object and
purpose of the Convention is damaged or altogether lost. Indeed, a
foreseeable effect of such reservations would be to preserve the possibility
that the US could permissibly engage in activity prohibited by the ACHR.
This cannot be allowed in keeping with its object-and-purpose obligations.
209

American Convention, art. 5(5).
Fox, supra note 54, at 265.
211
Indeed, the goal in paragraph (5) is “realizable” and is not “contrary to stated objectives
of the federal criminal law system.” Id.
212
Office for Justice Initiatives, Raise the Age, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT
SYSTEM (Mar. 5, 2020, 11:20 AM), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/ip/oji/raisetheage.shtml
[https://perma.cc/TM4C-S5SQ].
213
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Notwithstanding the question of general impropriety of this RUD, the
sentence of Article 9 in question provides that if a law is amended or
appealed, resulting in the imposition of lighter punishment, persons found
guilty of crimes prior to the change will benefit retroactively. 215 Current US
law generally presumes statutes to operate prospectively, and so disfavors
even ameliorative changes, considering them to be inconsistent with the
general constitutional prohibition of ex post facto legislation.216 A minority
of US jurisdictions allows the application of amendatory acts benefiting a
defendant—”retroactive amelioration”—only where the judgment of
conviction is not final,217 but Article 9 would go further, thus providing
another instance of increased protections for individuals in the US. Scholars
have already argued for expanding retroactive amelioration.218 Indeed, there
is a compelling fairness argument inherent to the doctrine, as the legislative
intent behind such a statutory change must have operated to lessen the
punishment,219 thereby re-characterizing the crime, in the eyes of society, as
lesser than it had been when it was committed. Justice would therefore call
for its even application to all those similarly convicted.

215

American Convention, art. 9.
S. David Mitchell, In with the New, Out with the Old: Expanding the Scope of
Retroactive Amelioration, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7-8 (2009) [In with the New, Out with the
Old].
217
See, e.g., People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956); In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948,
951 (1965) (“The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied
constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the
defendant of the act is not final.”); State v. Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1979);
People v. Schultz, 460 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1990).
218
See Mitchell, In with the New, Out with the Old, supra note 216; Eileen L. Morrison,
Resurrecting the Amelioration Doctrine: A Call to Action for Courts and Legislatures, 95
B.U. L. REV. 335, 336-337 (2015) (advocating for a baseline presumption of ameliorative
retroactivity).
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c)

Article 14: Right of reply
The proposed reservation on Article 14, concerning the right of reply,

similarly states a refusal to adhere to a provision of that article: “[t]he United
States does not adhere to paragraph (1) of Article 14, and understands that
paragraph (3) of that Article applies only to non-governmental entities.”220
As noted, it then states an understanding that paragraph (3), which requires
that every publisher, newspaper, motion picture, radio, and television
company have “a person responsible who is not protected by immunities or
special privileges,”221 applies only to non-governmental entities.222
Paragraph (3) reveals yet another instance of would-be increased protections,
this time with regard to sovereign immunity; under current US tort law, there
is no responsible person without immunities or special privileges who can be
sued when it is the US government that is the publisher of inaccurate or
offensive statements.223 Yet it is questionable whether enough legitimate
reasons exist for governmental immunity to outweigh the societal benefit of
an innocent’s chance at recovery after the government or state actor publishes
statements that might damage an individual due to the statements’ inaccuracy
or offensiveness. This is especially true when private companies would be
liable under the same circumstances. Indeed, “[i]t is not unreasonable or
impractical to require government publications to meet the standards of
Article 14.”224 As such, excluding such a RUD on Article 14, and thus
providing an additional avenue for relief in the US from such government
misconduct, can only be a benefit.
Again, with part of the point of ratification of the ACHR being to improve
domestic rights and enhance regional cooperation, the US must hold itself
out as willing to undertake parallel commitments as the other states of the

220
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American Convention, art. 14(3).
222
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Americas. While these ideas will need to be developed further, it is hoped
that this article can act as a general guide in order to help the US assume
meaningful rights protections under the Convention and thus play its role in
defending human rights in the region.
B.

Avoiding Non-Self-Executing RUDs
The US should avoid the attachment of an understanding that the American

Convention on Human Rights is non-self-executing. Such RUDs have been
construed by courts as barring treaty enforcement by the judiciary, effectively
fulfilling the isolationist objective that human rights treaties will not create
private causes of action in the US. 225 Particularly in the context of human
rights treaties, the automatic use of non-self-executing RUDs by the US, with
lack of follow-up implementation, has drawn criticism from other states and
human rights scholars, who have taken this phenomenon as another
embarrassing example of the US abrogating its commitments to international
human rights and universal values.226 In the international legal context, the
overuse of non-self-executing RUDs in tandem with a failure to enact
subsequent legislation may be seen to impermissibly postpone the
assumption of human rights obligations, and so run afoul of the object and
purpose of the treaty. If a state ratifies a human rights treaty but never
implements its provisions in a dualist or non-self-executing context, so as to
allow its citizens recourse or further contribute to the development of human
rights in the region, the effect of that ratification is marginal at best and
nominal at worst. Alternatively, such a practice could even be seen as an
instance of noncompliance with the treaty, even if not strictly violative of the
provisions, by the state ratifying but effectively denying its citizens recourse
under the treaty. Such overuse is dangerous to international relations and
other treaty law: the prospect of superficial ratifications cuts to the heart of
225

See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 421-22 (2000).
226
See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 84, at 132-33.
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the effectiveness of treaty-making, to the detriment US partnerships and
interests abroad.
The power to consent to a treaty on the condition that it has no domestic
force without congressional implementation is an implicit tenet of statehood.
As discussed above, the US is no stranger to this practice. In fact, it is so
entrenched in the US legal system that the Supreme Court has supported a
presumption against self-execution in treaties, even when no RUD to this
effect has been proposed.227 To combat this presumption, Professor Penny
Venetis has advocated the adoption of universal implementing legislative
language that would make the elimination of non-self-executing clauses in
treaty recommendations “the only thing that Congress and the President need
to do to make a treaty enforceable.”228 As a first step, the US should avoid
the Carter Administration’s proposed declaration that “the provisions of
Articles 1 through 32 of this Convention are not self-executing.”229
It has also been argued that non-self-executing RUDs are inherently
undemocratic as applied in the US, because they channel decision-making
away from legislative participation by Congress and toward constitutional
adjudication by the Supreme Court, an unelected body.230 Professor David
Sloss, for instance, has advocated for direct application of human rights
treaties, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
for that reason:
If the Supreme Court invalidates a state law on the grounds that the
law is unconstitutional, the Court closes the channels of political
participation because Congress cannot reverse a constitutional
decision of the Supreme Court. Suppose, though, that the Supreme
Court invalidated the same state law on the grounds that the law
227

See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505–06 (2008) (determining an International
Court of Justice decision to not be binding federal law because the UN Charter was not
self-executing); Venetis, supra note 75, at 111-12.
228
Venetis, supra note 75, at 148.
229
Letter to the President, supra note 78, at XVIII.
230
David Sloss, Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3
(2006).
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conflicted with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), a human rights treaty to which the United States is
a party. This would ensure that the channels of political participation
remain open, because Congress would retain the power to enact
legislation superseding the treaty as a matter of domestic law if
Congress disliked the result of the Supreme Court decision. Thus, if
courts based their decisions on the ICCPR instead of the
Constitution, they could protect fundamental rights in a manner that
is consistent with the principle of majority rule.231
Treaty-based litigation would thus provide a creative means of human rights
development by allowing a legal dialogue or evolution to occur between the
Supreme Court and Congress. Participation by one of the political branches
in this way is necessary: if a judicial decision based on a human rights treaty
were unsatisfactory or grounded in outdated law or societal values, then
elected members of Congress could pass superseding legislation. This in turn
would help shape not only human rights jurisprudence in terms of
interpreting and applying the treaty in question, but would also refine popular
and legal conceptions of human rights more fundamentally. Due to the
political stature of the US, and implications of US Supreme Court decisions,
this could contribute to the development of human rights in the region more
broadly. Of course, such treaty-based litigation is greatly hampered or
precluded altogether by a determination that the treaty is not self-executing.
Finally, as a political matter, the overuse of non-self-executing RUDs may
not only weaken the United States’ public reputation as a display of
exceptionalism or even hypocrisy, but such actions could also endanger the
future effectiveness of treaty-making. Professor Louis Henkin once remarked
in regard to a 1978 executive policy, “[w]hat sort of convention would you
231

Professor Sloss proceeds to recommend legislation that would require courts to avoid
constitutional decisions and instead favor direct treaty application, specifically with regard
to capital punishment under the ICCPR (although he notes the same scheme could serve
as a model for other areas of substantive law). Id. While such proposed legislation is
beyond the scope of this article, the same or very similar legislation could also be made in
reference to the American Convention and its enumerated rights.
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have if every country adhered subject to the reservation that it would not
make any changes in its laws?”232 The same warning applies here. Limiting
a treaty’s domestic effect in such a way is a conspicuous signal to the world
that “United States adherence remains essentially empty,”233 and therefore
that the US “does not take such conventions seriously as international
obligations.”234 The possibility follows, then, that states around the world
may take the US as an example and similarly make non-self-executing
reservations, to the detriment of international collaboration and universal
protection of human rights. In this way, such functionally superficial
ratifications could pose an existential threat to treaty-making in the context
of human rights, and perhaps beyond.
C.

Federal-State RUDs and the Creativity of State Implementation
Another RUD in common usage by the US seeks to clarify, or qualify,

treaties in line with the federal structure of the United States. Language to
this effect often states that any obligations assumed by the US will be subject
to the Constitution and federal jurisdiction, that no state laws will be
superseded by the federal action of ratifying the treaty, or that the federalist
system of government will be otherwise preserved.235 Because federal-state

232

Louis Henkin, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, 20, 22 (Richard E.
Lillich ed., 1981) (reprinted in RICHARD E. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
217, 218 (2d ed. 1991)).
233
Henkin, supra note 82, at 346.
234
Id. at 348.
235
For example, the following RUD language was proposed in regard to the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees:
The United States would assume obligations only in respect of matters that come
within the legislative jurisdiction of the Federal Government. State laws would
not be superseded by any provision of the Convention. With respect to any
articles in the Convention that may come within the legislative jurisdiction of
the states under our constitutional system, the Federal Government is obligated
to bring such articles to the notice of the appropriate state authorities with a
favorable recommendation.

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

40 Years Later

RUDs would be superfluous in light of the ACHR’s Article 28 (the Federal
Clause) and constitutionally redundant in light of the US structure of
government,236 the US should avoid attaching such RUDs to the American
Convention.
Interestingly, no federal-state RUD was proposed to the ACHR by the
Carter Administration. This was perhaps due to a political shift in
viewpoints,237 or maybe to the presence of the Federal Clause.238 While the
possibility exists that another administration may propose a federal-state
RUD, Article 28, which essentially serves as a built-in federal-state RUD, is
a strong indication that RUDs on this point would be legally superfluous.
Instead, consistent with the US federal-state balance of power, creative
state

legislatures

could

encourage

federal

ratification

by

early

implementation of the ACHR’s provisions. While the states, as units of the
federal state, have no power to independently ratify treaties, they can still
pass laws that give effect to the same rights delineated by the treaty,
consistent with both the federal Constitution and that of the state. 239 Indeed,
“treatymakers … [have] express[ed] an understanding that some provisions
of the treaties may be implemented by state and local governments rather
than by the federal government.”240 Domestic application of treaty law
necessarily takes a top-down approach, with the signing by the President,
ratification by the Senate, and then implementation by Congress and the
Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the
Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1374-75 (2006) (quoting Letter of Submittal from
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, U.S. Dep’t of State, July 25, 1968).
236
See infra Section I(C).
237
Fox, supra note 54, at 253 (“[I]t can be argued that the viewpoint from which such
attacks were made in the 1950s no longer prevails and that the supposed political necessity
for such a clause no longer exists.”)
238
As noted earlier, the Federal Clause relieves federal governments from preventing
violations on the part of state governments and therefore from interfering in intrastate
affairs, and generally allows states to keep control over their existing laws and means of
amending them. See infra Section I(C).
239
See Bradley, supra note 225, at 401.
240
Id.
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states. But if states, as “laboratories” of democracy,241 were to start the
process by passing legislation on the same subject matter, effectively
implementing the treaty’s provisions on their own, such a bottom-up
approach may be useful in advocacy efforts to convince the federal
government to ratify the human rights treaty in question. In this way, the
federal government could observe the legal and social effects of the
implementation and enforcement of treaty-protected rights before it ratifies
the treaty, and states and human rights activists could coalition-build based
on the state-level successes in order to persuasively encourage federal
ratification.
While it may then be argued that early state implementation would render
treaty ratification unnecessary, such a conclusion does not follow. In the
absence of the American Convention, there would be no possibility of InterAmerican Court participation, including legal remedies, institutional
collaboration, and jurisprudential dialogue between the Inter-American
Court and US Supreme Court. That is, as now, Inter-American Court
precedent could be invoked only indirectly by the Supreme Court as part of
the broader corpus of international law. Moreover, it is not superfluous—
rather, it is essential—to have both state and treaty protections. Such a legal
schema would further human rights in the US by theoretically providing
multiple means of relief, i.e., state-level rights via early implementation of
the treaty provisions’ contents, and then federal-level law via the treaty itself,
upon ratification. In addition, this framework would advance human rights
development by freeing federal and state courts to develop and refine human
rights jurisprudence domestically.
In the context of the American Convention, there are only a few instances
where US law does not already provide the protections enshrined in the
241

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”)
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It should therefore be relatively straightforward for

interested state legislatures to incorporate the substance of at least most of
the Convention’s provisions into legislation. There is nothing procedurally
stopping state legislatures, beyond politics, from incorporating even those
protections of the ACHR that go beyond existing US law, too. Doing so
would allow state courts the opportunity to interpret and enforce the
substance of the treaty provisions, thereby facilitating acceptance of the same
level of human rights, and thus the brunt of the treaty, by the federal
government.

V.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to leave a good prognostic for prompt ratification of the
American Convention, or even for the continued protection and development
of human rights by the US, in light of the current domestic political and social
climates. The policies and rhetoric coming from the White House in
particular have made this goal all but unrealistic during Trump’s presidency.
Even in the context of past administrations,
the United States has not been a pillar of human rights, only a
“flying buttress”—supporting them from the outside. Human rights
have been a kind of “white man’s burden”; international human
rights have been “for export only.” Congress has invoked
international human rights standards only as a basis for sanctions
against other countries. President Carter has invoked human rights
agreements in criticism of others.243
Hence, the trek ahead for human rights protection in the US, the region,
and the world remains steep. It is hoped that this article may lend a guiding
framework to a future administration that is inclined to continue the climb.

242
243

Letter to the President, supra note 78, at XVIII-XXI.
Henkin, supra note 26, at 421.
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United States ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights,
with no RUDs at all, would be a powerful step in a better direction.
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